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This paper presents salient facts on the performance of WTO dispute settlement, using an updated 
dataset on cases adjudicated between 1992 and mid 2020. The dataset provides a comprehensive 
compilation of information on WTO disputes, including complainants, respondents and third parties; 
the substantive matters tabled; the WTO provisions invoked; the claims that are accepted or rejected by 
adjudicating bodies; the time involved to complete the consultation, panel and appeal (Appellate Body) 
stages; and the identity of panelists and how they were appointed. We highlight elements of the operation 
of the system that are salient to WTO reform discussions, while drawing attention to the richness of the 
dataset by highlighting stylized facts in the hope others will use the data to investigate specific research 
questions and hypotheses. 
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JEL-Classification: F13; F51; K 40 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3706775




Since its establishment in 1995 and July 2020, over 600 bilateral trade disputes were adjudicated through 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system. The International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), a state-to-state court that adjudicates disputes in all areas of international law, has only addressed 
178 disputes since 1947.1 Given that the number of states that can submit disputes to the ICJ surpasses 
the WTO membership by one third, and that the ICJ also knows of non-litigious procedures (advisory 
opinions) that are not available to WTO adjudicators, the sheer volume of dispute settlement activity 
under the WTO has been impressive.  
The outlook for continued use of the WTO to resolve disputes is unclear at the time of writing. A 
decision by the United States to block the appointment of new Appellate Body (AB) members as the 
term of sitting adjudicators expired led to the AB becoming non-operational in December 2019. As a 
result, WTO members are left with only the first stage of what was designed to be a two-instance dispute 
settlement process.2 Whether the AB will be reconstituted following negotiations among WTO members 
remains to be seen.  
In this paper, we do not engage on the reasons for the AB crisis, the views of WTO members on this 
matter or potential solutions.3 Instead, we examine the record of WTO dispute settlement, using a newly 
updated and expanded dataset on adjudicated cases since 1995.4 The dataset includes information on the 
WTO members involved (complainants, respondents and third parties), the claims made and the 
provisions of WTO agreements that were invoked; rulings on a claim-by-claim basis by panels and the 
AB (if panel findings were appealed); the time taken for each stage of the process; the identity of 
panelists adjudicating each case; and how they were appointed; and for a subset of disputes, the outcome 
– whether rulings were implemented.5 The dataset can be freely downloaded from the EUI website.6 
Section 1 briefly describes the basic features of WTO dispute settlement and use of the system since 
1995. Section 2 discusses the frequency of participation by WTO members in panel and/or AB 
proceedings. Section 3 summarizes the subject-matter of disputes and the frequency of invocation of 
specific agreements and provisions. Section 4 presents data on wins and losses, based on the number of 
claims that are accepted by panels and the AB. Section 5 discusses the duration of the different stages 
of the process. Section 6 turns to the identity of panelists dealing with cases and the process through 
which they were appointed. Section 7 concludes.  
                                                     
* This paper reports on findings emerging from a dataset originally compiled by Henrik Horn, Louise Johannesson and 
Petros Mavroidis in 2011 and updated in 2016. This version extends the data on WTO disputes to July 2020. It is 
downloadable from the EUI website at https://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu/research-project/wto-case-law-
project/. We are greatly indebted to Matteo Fiorini for assistance in processing some of the information in the dataset; 
thank Aydin Yildirim for sharing his work on implementation of WTO disputes and Charles-Mary Cantore, Bill Davey, 
Rodd Izadnia, David Palmeter, Neeraj R.S., Alan Sykes and Nisha Telesford for helpful discussions, inputs and feedback. 
Financial support for updating the dataset was provided by the Global Governance Programme of the Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence (Italy). 
1 International Court of Justice. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/cases.  
2 In the course of 2020, the EU, China and another 20 WTO members agreed to a stop gap Multi-Party Interim Appeal 
Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA). This gives signatories the option to appeal against panel reports that involve other MPIA 
signatories. 
3 We have done so elsewhere. See Fiorini et al. (2020) and Hoekman and Mavroidis (2020a; 2020b; 2020c). 
4 Earlier versions were described in Horn, Johannesson and Mavroidis (2011) and Johannesson and Mavroidis (2017). 
5 Information on domestic implementation was kindly provided by Aydin Yildirim. This dimension of the dataset is not used 
in this article as it is in the process of being updated. See Yildirim (2020). 
6 See https://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu/research-project/wto-case-law-project/. 
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1. Basic features and use of the dispute settlement process 
The WTO dispute settlement system is unique in international relations in that it is a comprehensive, 
compulsory and binding third party adjudication regime. WTO members cannot take justice in their own 
hands: they must resolve trade disputes exclusively through procedures established in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU), the agreement organizing adjudication of disputes (DSU Art. 23.2).7  
WTO dispute settlement starts with a request for consultations. If these are not successful, a two-
stage adjudication process applies. Panels (the ‘first instance court’) establish the factual record, the 
relevant legal disciplines, and determine whether contested measures are inconsistent with WTO rules 
or specific commitments made by the defendant. The Appellate Body (AB) acts as the ‘second instance 
court’, with a mandate limited to review of a panel’s reasoning on matters of WTO law. The composition 
of panels (the panelists) changes for each case – panelists are ad hoc appointments in contrast to the AB, 
which is standing body of seven people who are appointed for a four-year term, renewable once.  
Panels and the AB are independent. The parties to a dispute cannot block the establishment of a 
panel, or the adoption of a panel report, or, if the report is appealed, the ruling on the AB.8 Assuming a 
favorable judgement for the complainant, the defendant will be called to bring its measures into 
compliance with its obligations. If it fails to do so, it confronts the threat of retaliation. If it complies, 
the case is in principle resolved, although this is conditional on the agreement of the complainant that 
the measures adopted are adequate. In case of disagreement on this score, disputes will be submitted to 
‘compliance panels’ (and eventually, the AB), which are requested to pronounce on the adequacy of 
measures adopted during the reasonable period of time that defendants enjoy to this effect (DSU Art. 
21.5). If defendants do nothing, or a compliance panel (and/or the AB, as the case may be) determines 
the adopted measures are inadequate, retaliation may be authorized. The amount of authorized retaliation 
is limited to removal by the complainant of ‘substantially equivalent concessions’ – usually involving 
increases in tariffs on products imported from the defendant WTO member. The appropriate amount of 
retaliation is established by an Arbitrator (the original panel, whenever possible) (DSU Art. 22.6). 
Decisions by the Arbitrator cannot be appealed. Retaliation can lawfully take place only following 
authorization by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)9 to do so. Authorization of retaliation does not 
remove the obligation of the WTO member concerned to bring its measures into compliance, and it must 
observe specific reporting requirements to this effect (DSU Arts. 21.6 and 22.8). Suspension of 
concessions (retaliation) is therefore ‘temporary’ (DSU Art. 22.8) and must be removed once measures 
have been brought into compliance. Consequently, whereas de jure the DSU (Article 22.1) calls for 
‘property rules’ – imposes an obligation to perform the contract – de facto ‘liability rules’ are tolerated, 
in that WTO members can ‘buy their way out of the contract’ (Schwartz and Sykes, 2002).  
The DSU provides for specific deadlines for completion of each stage of the process. For example, 
DSU Art. 4.7 states that sixty days after the receipt of the Request for Consultations, assuming that no 
satisfactory solution has been found by that time, a complainant can request the establishment of a panel. 
If disputing parties cannot agree on the panel composition within twenty days, they can request the WTO 
Director-General (DG) to appoint panelists (DSU Art. 8.7). Proceedings before panels should not exceed 
six months, unless panels inform the DSB they require nine months to complete their review (DSU Art. 
12.9). In similar vein, proceedings before the AB should not exceed sixty days, unless the AB, having 
informed the DSB, decides that it needs ninety days to complete its review of the case before it (DSU 
Art. 17.5). Appendix 3 to the DSU provides an indicative list of the timetable for the whole process.  
                                                     
7 The DSU is discussed in detail in Palmeter and Mavroidis (2006). Davey (2014) provides an excellent survey of its technical 
evolution since the inception of the GATT. 
8 Decisions regarding requests for consultations, establishment of a panel, appeal to the AB, adoption of panel/AB reports, 
arbitration to determine the reasonable period of time for implementation and/or the level of authorized countermeasures 
in cases of non-implementation cannot be blocked by a party to a dispute. Instead, “negative consensus” is required: all 
WTO members must agree not to adopt the findings of adjudicating bodies. 
9 The DSB administers the DSU. Each WTO member has one representative at the DSB.  
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The various timelines were adopted largely at the request of the US during the negotiations. The last 
years of the GATT were marked with an unusually high percentage of unadopted panel reports, as Hudec 
(1993) explains in his study.10 The US was at the receiving end of this practice, which was a factor 
motivating aggressive use of Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974 against foreign trade practices 
deemed to be detrimental to US exports (Bhagwati, 1990). Action under Section 301 was subject to 
specific deadlines for USTR in processing private requests for relief (Hudec, 1990). A substantial part 
of the DSU negotiation focused on emulating the Section 301 deadlines at the multilateral level 
(Mavroidis, 2016a). The idea was that, by adopting a strict calendar for processing disputes at the 
multilateral level, as well as by doing away with the onerous consensus-requirement for establishment 
of panels and adoption of their reports, the US would abandon aggressive unilateralism, and accept 
submission of all trade disputes to compulsory third party adjudication. The statutory deadlines reflect 
a significant negotiated settlement, explaining the emphasis placed by the US on the AB exceeding the 
statutory timelines in the DSU.11 
Use of the system 
A total of 623 bilateral disputes were adjudicated between January 1, 1995 and July 1, 2020. Information 
of all these disputes is contained in the dataset that we describe in what follows. The number is greater 
than the 595 disputes reported on the official WTO webpage (www.wto.org) because we consider the 
multi-party nature of some disputes. WTO disputes start with filings of ‘Requests for Consultations’. If 
more than one complainant drafts a ‘Request for Consultations’ for the same matter, these are captured 
in the same DS (dispute settlement) number (e.g., DS1, DS2 etc.). We do not always follow this method 
of counting. Instead, when warranted, we convert the data into “bilateral” disputes. That is, if two WTO 
members are complaining against a third member, we count each one of them as having one “dispute” 
each with the third member even if the complaints are captured by the same specific DS number reported 
on the WTO website. In EC-Bananas III, for example, only one DS number (DS27) was allocated to a 
dispute involving five complainants against the EU (European Union). We treat this litigation as five 
bilateral disputes.12  
WTO members requested consultations more often during the first ten years of the WTO then 
thereafter (Table 1 and Figure 1). The same pattern is observed with respect to requests for establishment 
of a panel (Figure 2), but not for appeals of panel findings. The latter varies substantially over time with 
some periods in which many reports were appealed and others where the number of appeals was limited 
(Figure 3).  
  
                                                     
10 Adoption of GATT panel reports required consensus, permitting a losing party to block reports.  
11 As discussed below, in practice panels exceed statutory timelines by a greater margin than the AB, something that has not 
been stressed by the US in its critique of the WTO dispute settlement system.  
12 This issue mostly arose in the early years of the WTO—see Figure 1. The differential treatment of reporting/numbering of 
disputes is due to the fact that defendants can object to a request by WTO Members to become co-complainants in already 
initiated disputes, and/or disagreements regarding whether to merge disputes relating to the same issue (DSU Arts. 4.11 
and 9). Note that if different WTO members contest the same measure, this generally will give rise to several DS numbers 
that deal with the same matter. For example, in Argentina-Import Measures three complainants requested the establishment 
of a panel; three different disputes were initiated, and three different DS numbers were allocated to the litigation (DS438, 
444, 445). Thus, the total number of dispute cases is not the same as the total number of trade practices that were adjudicated 
under the WTO. The latter is a subset of the former. We make no claim that our counting method is more appropriate than 
that used by the WTO but use it because it ensures symmetry regarding the number of participants per dispute 
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Table 1: Average Number of Disputes per 5-year intervals 
(based on 623 disputes, original proceedings only) 
1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015-2020 
40.8 29.6 15.6 17.2 21 
Figure 1: Number of Requests for Consultations per Year 
(based on 623 disputes: original proceedings only) 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of Requests for Establishment of Panel per Year 
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Figure 3: Number of Notices of Appeal per Year (original proceedings) 
 
2. The Participants 
There are three institutional players in WTO dispute adjudication: WTO members (the principals); WTO 
adjudicators (panelists and AB members); and the WTO secretariat. This section discusses the first set 
of players. Data on the role of adjudicators is discussed in Section 6. Information on the role of 
Secretariat staff on a case-by-case basis is not reported by the WTO.13  
WTO members can choose to act as complainants, and/or participate as a third party to a dispute. 
Third parties have reduced rights before panels and the AB. Their arguments need not be addressed by 
panels and/or the AB, although in practice their arguments are reflected in the factual part of panel 
reports. Third parties also cannot appeal panel reports and WTO members cannot participate as third 
parties before the AB, unless they have participated under the same capacity before a panel (DSU Art. 
17.4).14 The value of becoming a third party is that they can participate in meetings, receive the 
documents distributed in the first panel meeting and/or the only AB meeting with the parties (unlike 
panels, the AB meets with the parties only once),15 and make oral or written statements.  
There is a substantial literature regarding what are the factors influencing participation in the DSU.16 
Potential drivers include export trade shares as higher trade volumes increase the likelihood a dispute 
will arise (Horn et al. 2005), bargaining power considerations (Wickens 2009), the (lack of) capacity to 
identify trade barriers (Bown and Hoekman, 2005; 2008) and the cost of participation (Nordström and 
                                                     
13 Although DSU Art. 27.1 makes clear that the institutional function of the WTO Secretariat is to assist panel during 
proceedings the dataset only contains information on the members of the WTO Secretariat that participate in proceedings 
for early cases. The WTO Secretariat discontinued such reporting. This is unfortunate as the participation of the WTO 
Secretariat in dispute settlement proceedings is not inconsequential. For one, under DSU Art.8.6, the Secretariat has an 
important role in proposing panelists, as we discuss below. Furthermore, there are good reasons to believe that the WTO 
Secretariat participates quite actively in the preparation of reports. See Nordström (2005) and Johannesson and Mavroidis 
(2015).  
14 They can participate as amici curiae before the AB. The AB ruled this in EC-Sardines when accepting brief submitted by 
Morocco. 
15 Panels retain discretion to grant enhanced third party rights to applicants that can demonstrate an interest to this effect, see 
for example EC-Hormones here the panel upheld the request by Canada and the US to act as enhanced third party in each 
other’s complaint against the EU (para. 8.15), and the AB upheld the way the panel had exercised discretion on this issue 
(para. 154). 
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Shaffer 2008; Saggi 2012) and the extent of participation in preferential trade arrangements (Mavroidis 
and Sapir 2015). The dataset permits empirical assessment of these types of potential determinants.  
In synthesizing the bilateral dispute data contained in the dataset we classify the 164 WTO members 
into five groups, two comprising developed economies and the other three spanning emerging and 
developing economies, as follows: 
G2 EU (European Union) and US (United States) 
IND OECD member countries other than the EU and US, but excluding Chile and 
Colombia 
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China, the four largest and influential non-OECD 
countries 
LDC Least developed countries 
DEV All other developing and emerging economies 
Apart from least developed countries (LDC), the other groups do not comprise “official” categories as 
the WTO does not employ criteria mapping WTO members into country groups.17 Chile and Colombia, 
both OECD members, are classified under DEV because Colombia joined only in 2020. Chile joined 
the OECD earlier, but all its disputes occurred before it joined the OECD. Appendix Table 1 details the 
composition of these groups.18 
Complainants and Respondents 
Unsurprisingly, bigger markets are the most frequent targets of complaints, and act as defendants more 
frequently than they act as complainants themselves. Thus, the G2 is the most frequent complainant in 
requests for consultations and the most frequent respondent (Table 2). The same is true for disputes that 
led to the creation of a panel. The G2 have acted as respondents in half the total number of requests for 
establishment of a panel (199/395) (Table 3). DEV and BRIC have similar numbers of cases where they 
acted as complainants and respondents (85/70, and 52/61, respectively). The numbers are less balanced 
for G2 (146/199), and even more so for IND (112/65). The EU-US is the most frequent disputing dyad 
(72 cases) (Appendix Table 2) followed by China-US (39 cases). The US is the most frequent user/target 
of disputes. The EU is also a major player, but uses the system less intensively, including vis-à-vis China 
(14 cases vs. 39 for the US). 








                                                     
17 The latest UN resolution adopting the list of LDCs is from December 2018. It comprises of 47 countries. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf.  
18 The dataset reports all data on a bilateral/dyadic basis. Those interested in specific WTO member participation in dispute 
settlement should consult the dataset. What follows is simply a way to summarize and characterize broad trends. 
  Respondent  
 
 








t BRIC 3 11 64 8 86 
DEV 8 57 61 16 142 
G2 64 37 80 57 238 
IND 24 20 91 21 156 
LDC 1 0 0 0 1 
 Total  100 125 296 102 623 
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Over time the number of disputes brought to the WTO has declined, mostly reflecting more intensive 
use by the G2 in the early years of the WTO (Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Complainant Requests for Consultations and Respondents, 1995-2020 
Complainants      Respondents 
The DSU requires an (original) complainant that requests consultations to submit its request to both the 
designated defendant, as well as the WTO Secretariat. The latter will circulate it to the membership. 
Any member wishing to act as co-complainant, can then do so. The defendant must accede to this request 
(DSU Art. 4.11). If it is rejected, there is still a gain for the eventual co-complainant(s), since they will 
have received information that may lead them to initiate their own dispute. The multilateralization of 
Requests for Consultation ‘subsidizes’ those WTO members that were not able to detect the potentially 
illegal trade measure. High-income WTO members (G2 and IND) have most frequently requested to 
join a consultation (Table 4).  
On average requests to join consultations were accepted in less than half of all cases (550/1239). 
There is only partial information provided by WTO members on the outcome of a request to join 
consultations. There is complete information – whether a request was accepted or denied – for slightly 
less than half (45.5 percent) of cases where another WTO member requested to join (150 out of 330). 
There is no or partial information on the outcome for the other 54.5 percent of such cases. 
  
  Respondent  
 
 








t BRIC 1 4 43 4 52 
DEV 5 31 38 11 85 
G2 43 22 46 35 146 
IND 12 13 72 15 112 
LDC 0 0 0 0 0 
 Total  61 70 199 65 395 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3706775
Bernard M. Hoekman, Petros C. Mavroidis, Maarja Saluste 
8 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 








to join (%) 
Acceptance of 
request to join 
BRIC 
BRIC 3 8 11 72.7 0 
DEV 11 13 24 54.2 10 
G2 64 128 192 66.7 65 
IND 8 5 13 38.5 3 
 Total 86 154 240 58.0 78 
DEV 
BRIC 8 15 23 65.2 0 
DEV 57 53 110 48.2 37 
G2 61 119 180 66.1 24 
IND 16 67 83 80.7 63 
 Total 142 254 396 65.1 124 
G2 
BRIC 64 156 220 70.9 80 
DEV 37 75 112 67.0 40 
G2 80 157 237 66.2 40 
IND 57 54 111 48.6 30 
 Total 238 442 680 63.2 190 
IND 
BRIC 24 90 114 78.9 32 
DEV 20 33 53 62.3 25 
G2 91 227 318 71.4 83 
IND 21 38 59 64.4 18 
 Total 156 388 544 69.3 158 
LDC BRIC 1 1 2 50.0 0 
Total  623 1239 1862  550 
Third Parties 
DSU Articles 10 and 17.4 allow for third party participation of WTO members to disputes raised by 
other members. Neither provision assumes what the position of third parties is. As a result, third party 
submissions may side with the complainant or the respondent. The dataset provides information 
regarding third-party participation before panels and the AB for each dispute. For the panel-stage, in 
what follows we limit our focus to original (as opposed to compliance-) panels, as the subject-matter of 
compliance panels is quite limited. Focusing on original panels provides a more representative sample 
of third-party interest in each dispute. IND and DEV are the champions in third party participation 
(Tables 5 and 6). The LDCs have had very limited involvement as third parties. 
Table 5: Third Parties before Panels (original proceedings) 
Third party 
Number of group members 
who have been Third parties 
Number of Third party 
appearances for group 
Group’s share of all 
Third party appearances (%) 
BRIC 4 365 17 
DEV 56 686 32 
G2 2 267 12 
IND 14 835 38 
LDC 8 22 1 
Total 84 2175 100 
Note: Third party frequency is not based on bilateral disputes. Hence, a third party is only counted 
once for each distinct DS number. 
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Table 6: Third Parties before the AB (original proceedings) 
Third party 
No. of group members who 
have been Third parties 
Number of Third party 
appearances for group 
Group’s share of all Third 
party appearances (%) 
BRIC 4 190 17 
DEV 50 317 29 
G2 2 137 12 
IND 14 449 41 
LDC 6 12 1 
Total 76 1105 100 
Note: Third party frequency is not based on bilateral disputes. Hence, a Third party is only counted once for 
each distinct DS number. However, the joint submissions in DS267 and DS165 are counted for each individual 
WTO Member. 
3. The Subject-Matter of Disputes 
The substance of a dispute is determined by the complainant, who must decide whether to request 
consultations and under what terms. The respondent can only react to claims introduced by the 
complainant. The situation is somewhat different before the AB as both the original complainant and 
the original respondent can table claims/complaints as long as these do not constitute issues that were 
not discussed before panels (i.e., matters cannot be raised for the first time in appeals before the AB).  
In this section, we summarize information regarding the agreements and provisions invoked at the 
consultations-stage.19 The reason is that complainants cannot add new claims after they have issued their 
Request for Consultations. This is by case law construction, and not because of statutory discipline.20 
DSU Art. 7:1 sets out the terms of reference for panels: 
Panels shall have the following terms of reference unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise 
within 20 days from the establishment of the panel: To examine, in the light of the relevant 
provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter 
referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document ... and to make such findings as will assist the 
DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those 
agreement(s). 
This does not mean that panels (and/or the AB) must agree with the legal qualification of facts as 
presented by the complainant. The complainant has the burden to prove the facts, but the adjudicating 
bodies are charged with determining the correct legal basis and the subjugation of facts under it. Based 
on judicial economy grounds, panels (and/or the AB) may decide not to discuss some of the issues 
invoked (claims made). In similar vein, the Notice of Appeal before the AB is limited to the issues 
decided by the panel in the report being appealed (DSU Art. 16.4).  
                                                     
19 The dataset provides greater detail on the provisions and agreements invoked before panels and the AB. 
20 In its report on US-Shrimp (Thailand) the AB noted at §293 that: 
 [a]s long as the complaining party does not expand the scope of the dispute, [it would] hesitate to impose too rigid a 
standard for the ‘precise and exact identity’ between the scope of the consultations and the request for the establishment of 
a panel, as this would substitute the request for consultations for the panel request”. The Appellate Body has also held that 
a “precise and exact identity” of measures between the two requests is not necessary, “provided that the ‘essence’ of the 
challenged measures had not changed.” In our view, whether a complaining party has “expand[ed] the scope of the dispute” 
or changed the “essence” of the dispute through the inclusion of a measure in its panel request that was not part of its 
consultations request must be determined on a case-by-case basis. (emphasis in the original) 
 As a result, when the complainant submits a Request for Establishment of panel, it will at most include the claims it had 
included in its Request for Consultations. 
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3.1 WTO Agreements invoked 
What follows provides an aggregate picture of the invocation of the three main WTO agreements, 
GATT, GATS and TRIPS, as well as the most frequently invoked WTO Annex 1A agreements on trade 
in goods: those dealing with Antidumping (AD), Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM); 
Safeguards (SG), Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).  
Table 7 reports the frequency with which different WTO agreements are invoked in requests for 
consultations. GATT is by far the agreement invoked most often (36% of the total), followed by disputes 
concerning practice in the realm of contingent protection (AD, SCM, SG) which together account for 
another 24%. The WTO agreement itself (7%) and three other Annex 1A agreements – TBT (4%), SPS 
(4%), and the Agreement on Agriculture (7%) – make up most of the remainder (21%). While not 
negligible, the relatively low share of product standards-related and agricultural disputes suggests the 
agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round have been more effective than those dealing with 
contingent protection instruments.21  
Services and TRIPS each account for only 3% of invocations. This is surprising given the effort that 
went into negotiating these agreements and the underlying arguments that policies pertaining to these 
areas constrained access to markets. It suggests the agreements do not provide an effective basis for 
launching disputes or that the associated remedies on offer are insufficient to induce firms to bring cases 
forward. WTO Member’s GATS market access and national treatment commitments are generally 
limited (Hoekman, 1996), reducing the incentive to litigate about general obligations to address market 
access barriers (Marchetti and Roy, 2008).  
The relatively low number of TRIPS disputes is striking given that emerging economies such as 
Brazil and India were frequent targets of Section 301 investigations, and recurrent allegations by 
international business that China does too little to protect foreign IPRs (Mavroidis and Sapir, 2021). 
Like the case of the GATS, the low number of IPR cases suggests the TRIPS agreement led to changes 
in national IPR legislation to comply with TRIPS and/or does not address matters that concern business 
or does not offer an effective remedy.22 
Appendix Tables 3-5 provide more detail on invocation of these agreements by group of WTO 
members. G2 most frequently invokes the GATT and the SCM agreements as a complainant, and is 
most frequently the respondent across GATT, GATS, SPS, TBT, AD, SCM and SG. The G2 is the target 
of 50% of all invocations of these seven agreements by complainants. This is not surprising given the 
weight of these two players in world trade, but it is double their share of global trade. OECD member 
countries (G2 and IND) are the target of 65 percent of all complaints under these agreements, with SPS 
and SG the outliers at 77.5 and 58 percent, respectively. SG is the agreement where BRIC and DEV 
have the highest share of complaints, accounting for 42 percent of the total under this agreement. BRIC 
tends to be a less frequent target than DEV under these agreements, the only exception being SCM.  
 
  
                                                     
21 Product standards have grown in prevalence over time in many WTO Members. The use of mechanisms such as raising 
‘specific trade concerns’ in the relevant WTO committees may help explain the relatively low frequency of WTO disputes 
in this area. 
22 For further discussion and hypotheses see e.g., Pauwelyn (2010) and Yu (2019). 
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Table 7: Frequency of Invocations of WTO Agreements in Requests for Consultations 
Cited Agreement Frequency Percent 
GATT 510 (491) 36 
Antidumping (AD) 142 (133) 10 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 139 (130) 10 
Agriculture (AG) 93 (84) 7 
WTO 78 (69) 6 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 55 4 
Import‐Licensing Procedures (ILA) 59 (48) 4 
Safeguards (SG) 62 4 
Sanitary and Phyto‐Sanitary Measures (SPS) 49 4 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 49 (45) 4 
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 42 3 
Trade in Services (GATS) 37 (30) 3 
Protocol of Accession of the People’s Republic of China 26 2 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 20 1 
Customs Valuation (CV) 18 1 
Textiles and Clothing (ATP) 16 1 
Rules of Origin (ROO) 7 1 
Preshipment Inspection (PSI) 5 0 
Enabling Clause 4 0 
Government Procurement (GPA) 4 0 
Trade Facilitation (TFA) 3 0 
Paris Convention 3 0 
1979 Understanding Regarding Notification, 
Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance 
3 0 
GATT 1947 1 0 
WTO Decision on Notification Procedures 1 0 
Total 1,424 100 
Notes: The number of times various WTO Agreements have been invoked in Request for 
Consultations. No account is taken of how many articles are invoked under each agreement. If only 
one number is reported the number of invocations is the same for the WTO classification of 595 
disputes and the dataset of 623 bilateral disputes. If two numbers are reported, the first one 
corresponds to the 623 disputes; the second number in brackets is based on the 595 disputes. 
3.2 Provisions invoked 
Nondiscrimination, i.e., MFN (Article I) and national treatment (Article III) are the most frequently 
invoked provisions in disputes, accounting for 30 percent of all claims under the GATT (Table 8). 
Transparency (Article X) and use of quantitative restrictions (Article XI) are the third and fourth most 
frequently invoked provisions, jointly accounting for another 26 percent. Allegations of violation of 
tariff commitments (Art. II) account for only 10 percent of the claims made under the GATT.  
Most GATS disputes concern market access commitments. GATS Articles XVI (market access) and 
XVII (national treatment) are by far the most frequently invoked provisions in disputes concerning 
services trade (Table 9). Article II (MFN) usually is invoked in conjunction with one of these two 
provisions as it is a general obligation that is relevant for all specific commitments made by a WTO 
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Member. National treatment, MFN, and Art. 28 (rights conferred by a patent) are the most frequently 
invoked TRIPS provisions (Table 10).  
Table 8: Frequency of Invocations of GATT Provisions 
 Article   Frequency Share (%) 
I (MFN) 185 (175) 14.8 
II 129 (122) 10.3 
III (NT) 190 (183) 15.2 
IV 1 0.1 
V 18 1.4 
VI 135 (126) 10.8 
VII 12 0.1 
VIII 21 1.7 
IX 3 0.2 
X 165 (149) 13.2 
XI 159 (152) 12.7 
XIII 63 (53) 5 
XV 2 0.2 
XVI 17 1.4 
XVII 9 0.7 
XVIII 7 0.6 
XIX 57 4.6 
XX 9 (6) 0.7 
XXI 1 0.1 
XXII 4 0.3 
XXIII 42 (33) 3.4 
XXIV 11 0.9 
XXVIII 8 0.6 
Total 1248 100 
Note: Numbers in the brackets are based on 595 disputes. 
Table 9: Frequency of Invocations of GATS Provisions 
Articles Frequency Share (%) 
I 2 1.6 
II (MFN) 25 (18) 19.5 
III 8 6.3 
IV 6 (2) 4.7 
V 1 0.8 
VI 12 9.4 
VIII 2 1.6 
X 1 0.8 
XI 4 3.1 
XVI (Market Access) 28 (21) 21.9 
XVII (NT) 29 (22) 22.6 
XVIII 5 3.9 
XX 1 0.8 
XXIII 4 3.1 
Total 128 100 
Note: Numbers in brackets are based on 595 disputes.  
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Table 10: Frequency of Invocations of TRIPs Provisions 
Articles Freq.* Percent  Articles Freq.* Percent 
1 4 1.7  34 1 0.4 
2 10 4.3  39 5 2.1 
3 (NT) 20 8.6  41 12 5.1 
4 (MFN) 9 3.9  42 9 3.9 
7 1 0.4  43 2 0.8 
8 1 0.4  44 3 1.3 
9 6 2.6  45 2 0.8 
10 3 1.3  46 3 1.3 
11 2 0.8  47 2 0.8 
12 2 0.8  48 2 0.8 
13 2 0.8  49 2 0.8 
14 6 2.6  50 5 2.1 
15 6 2.6  51 2 0.8 
16 9 3.9  52 1 0.4 
17 1 0.4  53 1 0.4 
18 1 0.4  54 1 0.4 
19 1 0.4  55 1 0.4 
20 9 3.9  58 1 0.4 
21 1 0.4  59 2 0.8 
22 6 2.6  61 7 3 
24 6 2.6  62 2 0.8 
27 12 5.1  63 6 2.6 
28 10 4.3  65 15 6.4 
31 3 1.3  70 11 4.7 
33 4 1.7  Total 233 100 
 
Appendix Tables 6 and 7 provide similar information on the five most frequently invoked Annex 1A 
agreements: TBT, SPS, AD, SCM and SG. TBT Articles 2 and 5, and SPS Articles 2, 3, and 5 are the 
quintessential provisions invoked in the two product standards agreements. Market access is largely a 
function of complying with these provisions and it is not surprising that the majority of disputes center 
on these provisions. With respect to the three contingent protection instruments, complaints have 
focused on both provisions with substantive as well as procedural disciplines. The latter are frequently 
invoked both because the agreements contain detailed prescriptions on the processes to be followed by 
WTO Members when taking action and because victories on procedural grounds are often easier to 
accomplish and lead to the same outcome, as WTO case law, unlike domestic administrative legal 
orders, does not acknowledge “healing” procedures (Mavroidis, 2016b).  
4. Winners and Losers 
One of the allegations sometimes made by critics of WTO dispute settlement rulings – especially those 
on the losing end of a cases – is that adjudication is somehow biased in that some countries tend to ‘win’ 
more than others. Assessing whether this is the case is not straightforward. One reason is that in practice 
it is often not possible to determine objectively whether a WTO member ‘wins’ or ‘loses’ a dispute. 
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Take for example, Mexico-Telecoms. In this case, the US complains and wins its dispute to the effect 
that the owner of the telecom network (Telmex) contravened its obligations under the Telecoms 
Reference Paper, by charging unreasonably high prices. Mexico did not appeal the panel report. Did 
Mexico lose? Only if the government wanted to sustain the practice. The dispute permitted the Mexican 
government to require Telmex to change its access pricing policy because not doing so would give rise 
to retaliation by the US. Mexico could use GATT as an excuse to do something it wanted to do but could 
not because of domestic political economy forces. Moreover, Mexico generated goodwill from the US 
by not appealing the report while at the same time enhancing its standing at the WTO, showing it is a 
good international citizen.  
In EC-Bananas III, Ecuador, one of the complainants, won, and EU, the defendant lost. The panel 
and the AB unanimously condemned the EU bananas import regime, and, when the EU did not 
implement the report, Ecuador received authorization from the competent body (Arbitrator under DSU 
Art. 22.6 of the DSU) to retaliate against the EU. While this sounds like a win for Ecuador, retaliation 
is costly and unlikely to have any effect on the EU. Trade in bananas represents a substantial percentage 
of its GDP and the EU is one of its most lucrative export markets. EC-Bananas III was the third attempt 
to prevail against the EU before a GATT/WTO panel. Over the more than twenty years until the EU 
changed its regime in 2011 (Guth, 2012), Ecuador never received any compensation for the loss of trade 
caused by EU policy, as retroactive remedies are not suggested by WTO panels. By refusing to 
implement adverse rulings, for some twenty years the EU member states concerned placated a domestic 
lobby they cared about (mostly distributors) and the EU showed its support to the ACP (African, 
Caribbean, Pacific) producers of bananas, whose exports were treated preferentially in the EU market. 
These examples illustrate that winning or losing is a matter of private information: one must know the 
true objectives of the parties, which they may not reveal publicly. Losing may in fact constitute winning 
and vice versa. Determining overall winners and losers of disputes is a fraught proposition, one that 
often will be subjective and context specific 
More generally, ascertaining who wins and who loses is very difficult because many disputes involve 
several claims. Suppose a WTO member invokes various provisions and prevails in some and not in 
others. How do we distinguish between ‘important’ and ‘unimportant’ claims in similar scenarios? How 
do we know which claims matter more? One objective measure contained in the dataset is information 
on the individual claims presented in a dispute (Hoekman, Horn and Mavroidis, 2009). DSU Article 6.2, 
as interpreted in the AB report on Korea-Dairy, requires a Request for Establishment of a Panel to 
include all claims the panel must pronounce on. A claim involves (i) the identification of a factual 
situation (the challenged measure), and (ii) the legal provision that the challenged measure arguably is 
inconsistent with. For example, complainants in DS27 claimed that the EU bananas import regime, by 
imposing two different import duties depending on the origin of bananas, violated GATT Article I 
(MFN). WTO panels and the AB can rule on a dispute by deciding on fewer than the total number of 
claims on judicial economy grounds. DSU Article 7.1 permits this by calling on adjudicating bodies to 
make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings 
provided for in that/those agreement(s). Judicial economy has no consequences for quantifying the 
number of claims made, since it cuts across all disputes.23 
Figure 5 reports the percentage of successful claims by group. Except for BRIC, with more than 50% 
of all claims rejected by panels, the other groups are similar in the number of claims won when acting 
as complainants: some two-thirds of all claims are accepted. The data support the view that there is a 
process of self-selection of disputes. Complaining WTO members pick winning cases. This is an 
important observation insofar as the data on share of successful claims in disputes suggest WTO 
members do not litigate for the sake of litigating (e.g., to placate domestic lobbies).  
                                                     
23 This is a potentially interesting research question. To date, WTO Members have not raised concerns regarding asymmetric 
exercise of judicial economy. 
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Figure 5: Successful claims as complainant by group (all disputes, %) 
 
Table 11 disaggregates the information on claims won across ‘target’ respondent groups.24 Overall, the 
share of successful claims is similar across country groups except for DEV, where there is a lot of 
heterogeneity. DEV comprises countries that are likely to have the weakest administrative capacity 
(except for LDC, which do not participate in dispute settlement), wins substantially more claims in cases 
against BRIC and IND than against G2 and other DEV countries. Understanding this pattern requires 
further research. 
Table 11: Successful Claims of Complainants by Group (%) 
  Respondent (Panel)  
  BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
Complainant 
(Panel) 
BRIC  62.5 48.5 65.8 58.9 
DEV 26.7 66.7 75.7 25.2 48.6 
G2 68.1 58.1 59.0 60.3 61.4 
IND 76.7 63.7 68.8 62.3 67.9 
5. Statutory Deadlines and Observed Practice 
The dataset includes detailed information on the duration of each stage of the proceedings in practice. 
We start with Table 12, which relays the duration for each stage of the proceedings based on data 
reported by the WTO for the 595 DS cases. 
Comparing practice to statutory deadlines reveals the former usually exceeds the latter. Furthermore, 
there is evidence it pays to make unreasonable demands when there is discretion to decide on the 
duration of a process. Under DSU Art. 21.3(c) for example, an Arbitrator decides on the reasonable 
period of time (RPT) during which implementation of rulings included in a panel and/or AB report 
                                                     
24 The numbers are calculated as follows. For each WTO member (complainant) all claims across all relevant disputes are 
summed. These may be all disputes, as in Figure 5, or all disputes against a specific group of respondents, as in Table 11. 
In the latter case the share of successful claims is computed over the total number of claims and averaged across all 
complainants in a country group. The share of successful claims over total claims therefore is computed after summing 
claims within a set of relevant disputes. Consequently, the numbers in Figure 5 and the averages across respondent groups 
reported in Table 11 will only be the same if the total number of claims are equal across groups of respondents. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3706775
Bernard M. Hoekman, Petros C. Mavroidis, Maarja Saluste 
16 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
should occur. The statutory limit (fifteen months) established in the DSU serves as guideline – arbitrators 
remain free to decide on longer (as well as on shorter) periods for implementation.25 
Table 12: Duration of Each Stage of Proceedings 
(based on the WTO DS classification, i.e. n=595) 
Average length of process, months Statutory deadline Mean 
Consultations 
From the date of Request of consultations to the 
establishment of panel 
2 months 5.4 
Panel 
proceedings 
From the establishment of panel to circulation of the 
panel report 
9 months 17.1*  
Appeals 
From the date of the Notice of Appeal until the date 
of the circulation of the Appellate Body 
2–3 months 4.3 
RPT, Bilateral 
agreement 
Total length of period agreed between parties during 








From the date of the request to establish a first 
compliance panel until the date of circulation of the 
Compliance Panel Report. 
3 months 13.2 
AB compliance 
From the date of the first Notice of Appeal until the 
date of circulation of the Appellate Body 
compliance report. 
 5.4 
Note: RPT: reasonable period of time.  
* Average length of panel proceedings is based on our full bilateral dataset of 623 cases.  
Figure 6 reports data on the duration of consultations from the date of request for consultations to request 
of establishment (lightly shaded bars). We have also counted the time from the date of request for 
consultations to the date of settlement (settled/mutually agreed solution), for all those disputes where no 
request for establishment of a panel was ever submitted (dark bars). Whereas complainants can request 
establishment of a panel sixty days after the receipt of the Request for Consultations (DSU Art. 4.7), in 
practice the average consultation lasts substantially longer.26  
Table 13 provides data on the average time taken for consultations by different groups. There are 
very large differences across groups, both when acting as complainants and as respondents. DEV on 
average takes the least time when acting as a respondent and the most time when acting as a complainant. 
The average period for complainants is 10 months; for respondents, 12.3 months. Reich (2018) has 
shown that the propensity to resolve disputes at the consultations-stage has fallen over time. Figure 7 
confirms this observation: the propensity to resolve a dispute through consultations has declined in 
recent years. Initially, almost two thirds of all formal disputes were resolved at this stage of the 
proceedings, whereas in recent years it is closer to 50%.  
                                                     
25 Mavroidis et al. (2017) show that complainants consistently request for short, even on occasion unrealistic periods of 
implementation, whereas defendants seek lengthy periods. Arbitrators tend to adopt periods that spilt the difference. Similar 
evidence emerges from practice under DSU Article 22.6. Complainants generally claim greater damages suffered because 
of illegalities than defendants are willing to recognize, with arbitrators usually establishing numbers between the two. See 
Bown and Brewster (2016). 
26 Busch and Reinhardt (2001) show why it might be in the interest of both parties (on occasion) to press for a deal through 
consultations than to bring their dispute out in the open.  
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Figure 6: Duration of Consultations 
 
Table 13: Duration of consultations by group (months) 










 BRIC DEV G2 IND Average 
BRIC 4.5 7.3 6.5 11.7 7.5 
DEV 5.8 3.9 30.9 10.0 12.6 
G2 6.7 8.1 15.6 6.6 9.2 
IND 6.1 6.2 10.7 4.7 6.9 
LDC 25.1    25.1 
Avg 9.6 6.4 15.9 8.2 10 │12.3 
Figure 7: Settlements at the Consultation Stage, 1995-2018 
Turning to the duration of panel and AB proceedings, Figure 8 provides information regarding how long 
panels and the AB take to resolve a dispute on average; Figure 9 does the same for each year since 1995. 
Once again, duration is defined as the time between composition of panel, and the date of the issuance 
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of the report, and for the AB, the time between notice of an appeal and the date of issuance of the AB 
report. Table 14 reports data on average duration of panel and AB proceedings by group. 
Figure 8: Duration of Panel and AB Proceedings 
Panel proceedings     AB proceedings 
Figure 9: Duration of Panel and AB Proceedings, 1995-2018  
Panel proceedings     AB proceedings 
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Table 14: Duration of Panel and AB Proceedings by Group (months) 
  
Respondent (Panel stage) 
 
  Respondent (AB stage)  
  










  20.8 15.7 11.5 16.0 
 BRIC  12.8 3.6 3.0 6.5  
DEV 
13.3 17.0 16.9 37.0 21.1 
 DEV 9.9 4.0 3.8  5.9  
G2 
18.8 14.9 19.4 14.1 16.8 
 G2 4.9 3.3 4.3 3.1 3.9  
IND 
19.8 16.5 16.4 18.6 17.8 
 IND 5.0 8.8 4.1 6.1 6.0  
 
Avg 17.3 17.3 17.1 20.3 17.9  Avg 6.6 7.2 4.0 4.1 5.6  
Note: The average duration of cases across groups is different from that reported in Table 12 because the 
averages across groups differ. For the dispute settlement process as a whole over the period 1995-July 2020, the 
average duration of panel proceedings is 17.1 months.  
6. WTO Adjudicators 
WTO judges are divided into panelists serving on panels, the ‘first instance WTO courts’, and AB 
members serving the AB, the ‘second instance WTO court’). The former are ad hoc appointments with 
jurisdiction to adjudicate only a specific dispute. The latter are term-appointments, serving for a four-
year term that is renewable once.27  
The WTO Secretariat is heavily involved in the selection of panelists (per DSU Art. 8) but does not 
engage in the selection of AB members. Panelists can appear as members of the original panel, the 
compliance panel, and as Arbitrator to decide on the level of compensation under DSU Art. 22.6. If 
there is no intervening conflict or event that makes their appearance an impossibility, the members of 
the original panel will also compose the compliance panel, as well as the Arbitration body. AB members, 
besides serving on the AB are routinely appointed as arbitrators to decide the reasonable period of time 
for bringing measures into compliance with panel/AB findings.28 The WTO provides little information 
on matters such as remuneration, professional background and qualifications, or the criteria for selection 
of panelists, factors that are salient in terms of assessing the independence and impartiality of appointed 
adjudicators. Unfortunately, secondary sources are needed to shed light on matters such as remuneration 
of panelists,29 and the role of the Secretariat.30 The dataset is limited to aspects we can systematically 
document: the national origin of panelists, the frequency of their appointment, and whether the parties 
or the DG appointed them.31 
The Process for Selecting Panelists 
According to DSU Art. 8.1: 
Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals, 
including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a 
Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or Committee 
                                                     
27 Whether this will continue to be the case if and when the AB crisis is resolved remains to be determined. 
28 Mavroidis et al. (2017) provide detailed information on this dimension of the dispute settlement process. 
29 Johannesson and Mavroidis (2015); Pauwelyn (2015). 
30 Nordström (2005); Pauwelyn and Pelc (2019). 
31 Some information on education and professional experience of some panelists is reported but this is not done on a 
systematic and comparable basis, precluding inclusion in the dataset.  
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of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on 
international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member. 
Expertise is not the only relevant criterion. Panelists must exhibit demonstrable independence (DSU 
Art. 8.2). This is important considering that many panelists, per DSU Art. 8.1 as well as long-standing 
practice are members of WTO delegations. To this effect, panelists must sign a document indicating any 
existing or supervening conflict.32 DSU Art. 8.3 bolsters the requirement for independence by barring 
nationals of complainants, respondents and third parties to a dispute from acting as panelists, unless the 
parties to the dispute agree to their selection.33 
The WTO Secretariat maintains a list of individuals from which panelists to a specific dispute may 
be selected (DSU Article 8.4). The list comprises both governmental as well as nongovernmental 
potential panelists. WTO members propose individuals to be included in the list during the regular DSB 
meetings, and they can indicate whether the proposed individuals are experts in one or more areas of 
WTO law. This roster is of indicative nature since inclusion does not automatically lead to selection. To 
our knowledge, proposals for inclusion on the list have never been opposed, probably because inclusion 
does not guarantee automatic appointment to a panel. Furthermore, the Secretariat can and often does 
propose non-roster panelists. 
Following the request for establishment of a panel, the Secretariat meets with the parties to compose 
the panel. A panel can be composed of three or five panelists (DSU Article 8.5), although in the WTO-
era, panels have always been composed of three individuals. The Secretariat will propose names that the 
parties can reject only for compelling reasons (DSU Article 8.6). There is no case law on this score, 
although proposals by the Secretariat are routinely rejected. If parties to the dispute cannot agree on one 
or more panelists within twenty days (counting from the day of establishment of the panel), they can 
request that the DG complete or appoint the full panel (DSU Article 8.7). The DG must do so within ten 
days, after consulting the Chairman of DSB, as well as the Chairman of the relevant Council or 
Committee.34 Thus, the Secretariat is quite influential in panel appointments. WTO staff members of the 
divisions have discretion to propose potential panelists, and the DG has the right to decide on 
appointments when the parties to a dispute reject Secretariat-proposed panelists.35  
The Process for Selecting AB Members  
The Secretariat does not play a similar role in the appointment of AB members. The AB comprises seven 
persons appointed for a four-year mandate, renewable once (DSU Art. 17.1 DSU). Candidates must 
correspond to the requirements embedded in DSU Art. 17.3, which largely reflect similar characteristics 
that inform the selection of panelists: 
The AB shall comprise persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, 
international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally. They shall be 
unaffiliated with any government. The AB membership shall be broadly representative of 
membership in the WTO. All persons serving on the AB shall be available at all times and on short 
notice, and shall stay abreast of dispute settlement activities and other relevant activities of the WTO. 
                                                     
32 WTO Doc. WT/DSB/RC/1 of December 11, 1996. This document includes the Rules of Conduct that not only panelists, 
and AB members, but also experts appearing before the WTO courts, as well as members of the WTO Secretariat must 
observe. 
33 This has happened only exceptionally. An example is US-Zeroing (EC), where the parties (EU and US) agreed to the 
selection of two of their nationals (Hans Beseler, EU; William J. Davey, US) to serve as panelists. 
34 In disputes involving alleged inconsistencies with the Antidumping Agreement for example, the DG will consult with the 
Chair of the Council for Trade in Goods, as well as the Chair for the Antidumping Committee. 
35 This procedure differs from investment arbitration where parties to the dispute appoint one arbitrator each, and the two 
appointed arbitrators decide on the umpire. See e.g., Pauwelyn (2015). There is circumstantial evidence that parties to a 
WTO dispute have very exceptionally preempted the Secretariat’s discretion to propose panelists on which they agreed 
between themselves.  
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They shall not participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or indirect 
conflict of interest. 
When the AB was constituted for the first time, WTO delegations created a Preparatory Committee to 
determine the selection process for the members of the AB. Following a recommendation by this body, 
the DSB established an organ comprising the WTO DG and the Chairs of the General Council, the DSB, 
the Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services, and the TRIPs Council. This group 
would receive nominations by WTO members, deliberate, and propose its nominees to the DSB. 
Appointments to the AB are made by DSB, deciding by consensus.36  
DSU Art. 17.1 states that three (rotating) members of the AB (a division) hear an appeal. Neither the 
DS nor its Working Procedures define the formula for selection of a division.37 A presiding AB member 
will be selected for each division (Working Procedures, Rule 7). Although a division hears and decides 
specific cases (Rule 3), a practice of collegiality has developed. To promote consistency and coherence 
in decision-making, Rule 4 reflects the so-called collegiality-requirement, calling on the members of a 
division to exchange views with other AB members on the resolution of the dispute before them. It is 
the Division alone, however, that takes the final decision. 
Panelists 
Whether recommendations on the panelist selection made by the Secretariat are accepted by the parties 
to the dispute or are appointed by the DG may have a bearing on understanding how the dispute 
settlement system operates. In practice, panelists mostly are appointed by the DG – in some 70 percent 
of the time (Table 15). The dataset suggests the role of the DG may matter for the outcome of cases as 
the percentage of winning complainants increases substantially when the DG appoints panelists. Using 
our measure of number of claims ‘won’ in DG appointed cases complainants won 64.7 percent of their 
claims. In the other 30 percent of cases where parties accepted the panelist suggestions made by the 
Secretariat, complainants were successful for only 52.2 percent of the claims put forward. This 
dimension of the process calls for further research to understand whether this pattern is robust and why 
it occurs. 
Table 15: Frequency of Appointment by Parties and DG (Original and 21.5 DSU proceedings) 
Appointment by Frequency Share (%) 
DG 219 70 
Parties 94 30 
Total 313 100 
One input into analysis of this pattern is information on the background of panelists. Tables 16 and 17 
report data on one potentially relevant factor: the nationality of panelists. IND and DEV account for 
most panelists (Table 16). The EU28 and eight other WTO Members (New Zealand, Switzerland, 
Australia, Canada, Mexico, South Africa, Chile, and Uruguay) account for 56.5 percent of all panelists 
                                                     
36 WTO Doc. WT/DSB/1. 
37 Anecdotally, it seems that on appointment, each member of the AB receives a number. A combination of three numbers, 
rotating according to a secret formula, will hear appeals as they are coming to the AB. For example, numbers 1, 2 and 5 
will hear appeal against DS 1, numbers 2, 6 and 9 will hear appeals against DS 2 and so on. What is unknown is the formula 
for rotating the divisions. Julio Lacarte-Muró has noted that a member of the first AB designed the formula for appointment 
to divisions. See https://www.acwl.ch/interview-with-ambassador-julio-lacarte-muro/. 
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appointed between 1995 and 2020. The US has not seen many of its nationals sit on panels – Americans 
represent less than 2 percent of the total – compared to 9 percent for the EU (Table 17).38  
Table 16: Frequency of Appointment of Panelists by Group (Original and 21.5 DSU 
proceedings) 
Panelists Frequency Share (%) 
IND 408 43.4 
DEV 371 39.5 
BRIC 54 5.8 
G2 101 10.7 
LDC 5 0.5 
Total 939 100 
 
Table 17: National Origin of Panelists and Frequency of Appointment by WTO Member 
Original and 21.5 DSU proceedings 
IND Freq. Share (%) DEV Freq. Share (%) BRIC Freq. Share (%) 
New Zealand 76 8.1 Pakistan 24 2.5 India 19 2.0 
Switzerland 72 7.7 Venezuela 24 2.5 Brazil 33 3.5 
Australia 64 6.8 Thailand 16 1.7 China 2 0.2 
Canada 45 4.8 Jamaica 12 1.3 Total 54 5.8 
Mexico 41 4.4 Egypt 11 1.2    
Hong Kong 25 2.7 Costa Rica 9 0.9 G2 Freq. Share (%) 
Singapore 17 1.8 Ecuador 8 0.8 EU 85 9.0 
Israel 16 1.7 Barbados 5 0.5 US 16 1.7 
Norway 15 1.6 Belize 5 0.5 Total 101 10.7 
Japan 14 1.5 Mauritius 5 0.5    
Korea 12 1.3 Peru 4 0.4 LDC Freq. Share (%) 
Iceland 9 0.9 Guatemala 3 0.3 Bangladesh 3 0.3 
Chinese Taipei 2 0.2 Morocco 3 0.3 Zambia 2 0.2 
Total 408 43.5 Malaysia 2 0.2 Total 5 0.5 
   Saudi Arabia 2 0.2    
DEV Freq. Share (%) Indonesia 1 0.1    
South Africa 51 5.4 Kenya 1 0.1    
Chile 51 5.4 Panama 1 0.1    
Uruguay 46 4.9 Saint Lucia 1 0.1    
Philippines 32 3.4 Trinidad&Tobago 1 0.1    
Colombia 27 2.9 Tunisia 1 0.1    
Argentina 24 2.5 Zimbabwe 1 0.1    
   Total 371 39.5    
         
In the early years of the WTO the share of panelists from the G2 was relatively large. Over time, this 
declined, as did the share of IND (Figure 10). Conversely, the share of DEV increased substantially, in 
recent years accounting for over 50 percent of panelists. One reason for this pattern is that it has become 
increasingly difficult to appoint panelists of a certain nationality, as parties routinely disapprove of 
nationals of members participating as third parties or that have trade agreements with a disputing party. 
                                                     
38 Nationality is of course, not necessarily a reason for bias. Nevertheless, there is a good basis for this provision, since most 
panelists are or have been government officials. 
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The increasing influence of developing countries in the WTO and/or preferences of the Secretariat/DG 
regarding the composition of panels may also play a role.  
Figure 10: Origin of Panelists by Group over time (Original and 21.5 DSU proceedings) 
 
Another potentially relevant factor concerns the frequency of individual appointments. In principle, one 
might expect panelists with expertise in issues coming under the purview of regularly invoked WTO 
agreements to be nominated repeatedly. Panelists are appointed on an ad hoc basis to adjudicate one 
specific dispute. If all appointed panelists were legitimate experts of WTO law and policy, repetition in 
appointments would be largely an un-interesting issue. There are good reasons to doubt the depth and 
extent of expertise of appointed panelists, although the lack of transparency regarding the qualifications 
of a sizeable percentage of panelists impedes a systematic evaluation. Table 18 presents information on 
the number of nominations of individual panelists. Two-thirds (65.8%) of all panelists were appointed 
once or twice. Only 13 percent of all panelists have served more than four times. This suggests limited 
interest by the Secretariat and the WTO membership in creating a pool of panelists with demonstrated 
expertise and capturing learning economies. 
AB Members 
As noted above, appointments to the AB are a matter for WTO Member to determine. The United States 
supplied four AB members during the 1995-2020 period; the EU and Japan both supplied three; China, 
Egypt, India, Korea and the Philippines provided two; and Australia, Brazil, Mauritius, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Uruguay, and South Africa each supplying one. The countries providing AB members tends to 
correlate only imperfectly with the nationality of panelists and is skewed more towards large traders that 
are underrepresented in panels – e.g., US, Japan, and China. Mapped into our groups AB appointments 
are roughly balanced: G2: 7; IND: 8; BRICS: 5 and DEV: 7.39 
Once appointed, allocation of cases to AB members is automatic, following the process described 
above for allocating AB members to divisions, unless AB members indicate a conflict of interest in 
adjudicating a dispute. Appendix Table 8 reports the number of divisions in which individual AB 
                                                     
39 Information on the professional background of AB members is provided on the WTO website 
(https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm), This permits assessment of the characteristics 
of appointees. This information is not included in the dataset. 
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members participated. There is no reporting on instances where an AB member indicated a conflict of 
interest. Doing so relies on self-disclosure only – no disciplines are imposed by the WTO membership 
nor are there formal criteria to establish when a conflict may arise. 
Table 18: Number of Repeat Panelists (Original and 21.5 DSU proceedings) 
Number of panels served on As Chair Non-chair Total no. of panelists Share (%) 
1 44 122 160 44.8 
2 21 58 75 21.0 
3 13 35 46 12.9 
4 14 19 30 8.4 
5 3 13 16 4.5 
6 4 3 6 1.7 
7 1 10 11 3.1 
8 3 1 4 1.1 
9    0.0 
10 2 1 3 0.8 
11  1 1 0.3 
12  1 1 0.3 
13 2 1 3 0.8 
14    0.0 
15    0.0 
16 1  1 0.3 
Total 108 265 357 100 
7. Concluding Remarks  
Often heralded as the ‘crown jewel’ of the WTO, the dispute settlement system today is under extreme 
stress. Critics point to its reliance on forward looking compliance, that is, to only recommend 
prospective remedies and a failure to ‘complete’ the contract through methodologically sound reasoning 
and understanding of the various WTO provisions. Others, notably the US, have been critical of the 
system for the opposite reason, alleging the AB has too frequently overstepped its mandate and does not 
abide with some of the provisions of the DSU, e.g., timelines.40 The AB ceased being able to operate in 
December 2019 as a result of US refusal to agree to appoint new AB members. Resolution of the crisis 
is likely to require reform to how the system works. Doing so is critical, as irrespective of views on its 
operation, the WTO dispute settlement system remains the only comprehensive compulsory third party 
adjudication regime extant. Ensuring it can fulfill that role in promoting peaceful resolution of trade 
conflicts is vital for salience of the WTO looking forward.  
Our overview of some of the stylized facts that emerge from the first 25 years of WTO dispute 
settlement suggests many potential areas for empirical research on the operation of the system. The data 
also shed light on some of the criticisms directed at the system and potential areas for reform-oriented 
deliberation. We have argued elsewhere (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2020b) that the US critique of the 
operation of the AB has detracted from focusing on other features the dispute settlement system, notably 
the first stage panel process. The data make clear that panels regularly do not come even close to 
satisfying the timelines called for in the DSU, suggesting consideration be given to revisiting the 
statutory deadlines. Given the importance of timely conflict resolution, determining why this pattern has 
emerged would help inform whether extending deadlines is an appropriate measure. Insofar as the 
general pattern of one-time ad hoc appointments to panels and the inevitable associated learning curve 
                                                     
40 There is a large literature on these matters. See e.g. Wu (2015) and Mavroidis (2016a, 2016b). For a compilation of 
arguments offered by the US for its stance on the AB, see USTR (2020). 
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for appointed panelists explains the pattern, another option could be to revisit this dimension of WTO 
dispute settlement.  
The consistently high share of panel reports that are appealed, notwithstanding the decline in the 
average number of cases over time, also suggests a focus on the operation of the panel process may be 
warranted as WTO members consider reform options and opportunities. The changing composition of 
panels has been accompanied with more appeals, more pressure on the AB and greater contestation of 
the process generally. Research on the role of the professional background of panelists; the association 
between appeals and panels that include panelists that have repeat experience; the utility of the roster of 
panelists and role of the Secretariat/DG in appointing panelists may generate valuable insights to inform 
deliberations on reform. 
A related question concerns the evolution of the ‘complexity’ of dispute settlement cases. There is a 
perception that cases have become more complex over time.41 Assessing the extent to which this is the 
case can be relevant from a reform perspective. One challenge here is how to assess ‘complexity’, but 
one indicator could be the frequency and extent to which statutory deadlines are exceeded. The trend in 
the number of claims made in disputes over time may also correlate with complexity. However 
complexity is assessed, what is unambiguous is that the WTO has substantially increased the number of 
lawyers working in the various Divisions of the WTO dealing with dispute settlement. This rose from 
less than ten in 1995 to almost sixty in 2019. Much of the growth occurred in the post 2015 period.42 To 
what extent this is associated with ‘complexity’ and the quality of panel adjudication – and the quality 
of appointed panelists – is another question that deserves greater attention and research. The desirability 
of the very high turnover of panelists associated with ad hoc appointments that have come to exclude 
nationals from the G2 and skew towards DEV, and the absence of a pool of experts that regularly engage 
in adjudication at the panel stage may be a once desirable feature of the system that has become a bug 
that WTO Members may want to re-consider.  
A notable feature of the first 25 years of WTO dispute settlement is the underrepresentation of 
services trade and IPR-related disputes. Similarly, one can point to the relatively limited use of the DSU 
to address matters that partially motivated the resort to unilateral trade measures by the United States 
starting in 2017. As noted by many observers, to a significant extent this points to gaps in the multilateral 
rulebook and a need to update the substantive provisions of the WTO (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2020a). 
But it may also point to weaknesses associated with the characteristics of the dispute settlement process. 
The stylized facts provide indications and pointers for WTO Members to reflect on these and other 
dimensions of dispute settlement working practices as part of WTO reforms more generally.  
  
                                                     
41 See e.g., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/carim318_e.htm.  
42 See Davey (2015) and Mavroidis (2015). 
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Appendices 
Appendix Table 1: Mapping of WTO Membership to Groups 
G2   LDC 
EU Brunei Darussalam Montenegro Afghanistan 
US Cabo Verde Morocco Angola 
 Cameroon Namibia Bangladesh 
BRIC Chile Nicaragua Benin 
Brazil Colombia Nigeria  Burkina Faso 
China Congo North Macedonia Burundi 
India Costa Rica Oman Cambodia 
Russian Federation Côte d'Ivoire Pakistan Central African Republic 
 Cuba Panama Chad 
IND Dominica Papua New Guinea Congo, Dem. Rep.  
Australia Dominican Republic Paraguay Djibouti 
Canada Ecuador Peru Gambia 
Chinese Taipei Egypt Philippines Guinea 
Hong Kong, China El Salvador Qatar Guinea-Bissau 
Iceland Eswatini Saint Kitts and Nevis Haiti 
Israel Fiji Saint Lucia Lao 
Japan Gabon 
Saint Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
Lesotho 
Korea Georgia Samoa Liberia 
Liechtenstein Ghana Saudi Arabia Madagascar 
Mexico Grenada Seychelles Malawi 
New Zealand Guatemala South Africa Mali 
Norway Guyana Sri Lanka Mauritania 
Singapore Honduras Suriname Mozambique 
Switzerland Indonesia Tajikistan Myanmar 
Turkey Jamaica Thailand Nepal 
 Jordan Tonga Niger 
DEV Kazakhstan Trinidad and Tobago Rwanda 
Albania Kenya Tunisia Senegal 
Antigua and Barbuda Kuwait Ukraine Sierra Leone 
Argentina Kyrgyz Republic United Arab Emirates Solomon Islands 
Armenia Macao, China Uruguay Tanzania 
Bahrain Malaysia Venezuela Togo 
Barbados Maldives Viet Nam Uganda 
Belize Mauritius Zimbabwe Vanuatu 
Bolivia Moldova  Yemen 
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Appendix Table 2: Most Frequent Dispute Dyads 
WTO Members # Disputes WTO Members # Disputes 
EU US 72 Colombia Panama 3 
China US 39 Dominican Rep. Honduras 3 
Canada US 28 EU Colombia 3 
Korea US 20 EU Guatemala 3 
EU India 19 EU Honduras 3 
India  US 19 EU Norway 3 
Mexico US 17 EU Panama 3 
Canada EU 16 EU Turkey 3 
Brazil US 15 Pakistan US 3 
Argentina EU 15 Russia US 3 
China EU 14 US Venezuela 3 
Japan US 14 Armenia  Ukraine 2 
Brazil EU 11 Australia Canada 2 
Argentina US 10 Australia India 2 
EU Russia 8 Australia Indonesia 2 
Japan Korea 8 Australia Philippines 2 
EU EU43 8 Brazil Japan 2 
Argentina Chile 7 Brazil India 2 
EU Japan 7 Brazil Indonesia 2 
EU Korea 7 Canada Korea 2 
Indonesia US 7 Chile Colombia 2 
EU Mexico 7 Chile Peru 2 
EU Thailand 7 China Japan 2 
EU Indonesia 6 Costa Rica Dominican Republic 2 
Australia US 6 Costa Rica Trinidad & Tobago 2 
Thailand US 5 EU New Zealand 2 
Russia Ukraine 5 EU Pakistan 2 
Chile EU 5 EU Peru 2 
Brazil Canada 5 Ecuador Mexico 2 
Turkey US 5 India Japan 2 
Philippines US 5 India Turkey 2 
Australia EU 4 Indonesia Japan 2 
China Mexico 4 Indonesia New Zealand 2 
Guatemala Mexico 4 Moldova Ukraine 2 
Canada China 4 Morocco Tunisia 2 
US Viet Nam 4 New Zealand US 2 
Argentina Brazil 3 Norway US 2 
Argentina Peru 3 Qatar Saudi Arabia 2 
Canada Japan 3 Qatar UAE 2 
Chile US 3 Switzerland US 2 
Chinese Taipei India 3 Thailand Turkey 2 
    
 
  
                                                     
43 There have been disputes at the WTO between countries that have become EU member states since the WTO was 
established. For example, DS297 was a dispute between Hungary and Croatia. These cases are captured in the data as part 
of G2. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3706775
Informing WTO Reform: Dispute Settlement Performance, 1995-2020 
European University Institute 31 
Appendix Table 3: Frequency of Invocations of GATT in Requests for Consultations by Group 
Agreement Complainant Respondent  
  BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
GATT 
BRIC 2 6 55 3 66 
DEV 7 51 51 15 124 
G2 54 29 55 39 177 
IND 23 19 81 19 142 
LDC 1 0 0 0 1 
 Total 87 105 242 76 510 
 
 
Appendix Table 4: Frequency of Invocations of GATS in Requests for Consultations by Group 
Agreement Complainant Respondent  
  BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
GATS 
BRIC 0 2 2 0 4 
DEV 0 6 8 1 15 
G2 5 0 4 4 13 
IND 1 0 2 2 5 




Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3706775
Bernard M. Hoekman, Petros C. Mavroidis, Maarja Saluste 
32 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
Appendix Table 5: Frequency of Invocations of Select Annex 1A Agreements (Trade in Goods) 
in Requests for Consultations by Group: SPS, TBT, AD, SCM, SG 
       
Agreement Complainant Respondent  
  BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
SPS 
BRIC 0 3 2 0 5 
DEV 1 1 5 4 11 
G2 4 0 5 9 18 
IND 1 1 8 5 15 
 Total 6 5 20 18 49 
       
TBT 
BRIC 0 4 2 0 6 
DEV 2 0 10 6 18 
G2 1 2 7 4 14 
IND 1 1 14 1 17 
 Total 4 7 33 11 55 
 
 
Agreement Complainant Respondent  
  BRIC DEV G2 IND Total 
AD 
BRIC 1 4 24 2 31 
DEV 1 16 16 3 36 
G2 8 4 10 5 27 
IND 4 9 30 4 47 
LDC 1 0 0 0 1 
 Total 15 33 80 14 142 
       
SCM 
BRIC 0 2 21 4 27 
DEV 2 2 9 0 13 
G2 18 6 20 14 58 
IND 8 2 26 5 41 
 Total 28 12 76 23 139 
       
SG 
BRIC 1 0 6 1 8 
DEV 0 16 2 1 19 
G2 0 4 7 1 12 
IND 1 4 18 0 23 
 Total 2 24 33 3 62 
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Appendix Table 6: Frequency of Invocation of Annex 1A (Trade in Goods) Agreements 
(Aggregate results) 
TBT  SPS 
Articles Freq.* Share (%)  Articles Freq.* Share (%) 
1 1 0.9  1 2 0.8 
2 54 50  2 48 19.9 
3 2 1.8  3 27 11.2 
4 1 0.9  4 9 3.7 
5 22 20.4  5 47 19.5 
6 7 6.5  6 13 5.4 
7 4 3.7  7 25 10.4 
8 3 2.8  8 26 10.8 
9 2 1.8  10 5 2.1 
10 1 0.9  13 1 0.4 
12 8 7.4  Annex B 19 7.9 
14 1 0.9  Annex C 19 7.9 
Annex 1 2 1.8     
Total 108 100  Total 241 100 
*The number of times various articles have been invoked in the Request for Consultations by the 
original complainants. An Article is counted only once even if referred to several times. Hence, 
if for instance SCM or AD, Arts. 3.1 and 3.2 have been both invoked, the Table counts this as 
one invocation of Art. 3. Equivalently, if for instance GATT Art. III.1 and III.2 have been both 
invoked; the Table counts this as one invocation of Art. III. 
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Appendix Table 7: Frequency of Invocations of Provisions in the AD, SCM, and SG Agreements 
AD   SCM    SG  
Article Freq. Share (%)  Article Freq. Share (%)  Article Freq. Share (%) 
1 92 (83) 10.4  1 50 8.6  1 2 0.5 
2 98 11.1  2 35 6  2 54 14.5 
3 84 9.5  3 74 12.8  3 47 12.6 
4 32 3.6  4 14 (6) 2.4  4 55 14.8 
5 89 (80) 10.1  5 26 (25) 4.5  5 52 14 
6 93 10.6  6 25 4.3  6 15 4 
7 31 3.5  7 15 (7) 2.6  7 33 8.9 
8 15 (6) 1.7  9 1 0.2  8 24 6.4 
9 69 7.8  10 57 (48) 9.8  9 17 4.6 
10 9 1  11 39 (30) 6.7  11 23 6.2 
11 49 5.6  12 23 4  12 50 13.4 
12 61 7  13 5 0.9  Total 372 100 
15 8 0.9  14 27 4.7     
16 1 0.1  15 23 4     
17 7 0.8  16 5 0.9     
18 74 (65) 8.4  17 11 1.9     
19 1 0.1  18 12 (3) 2     
21 1 0.1  19 32 5.5     
32 1 0.1  20 3 0.5     
Annex I 9 1  21 18 3.1     
Annex II 56 6.4  22 14 2.4     
Total 880 100  25 5 0.9     
    27 7 1.2     
    28 3 0.5     
    30 1 0.2     
    32 47 (38) 8.1     
    Annex I 1 0.2     
    Annex II 2 0.3     
    Annex III 2 0.3     
    Annex IV 2 0.3     
    Total 579 100     
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Appendix Table 8: Frequency of Appointment of AB Members  
(Original and 21.5 DSU proceedings) 
AB Member No. of Appeals 
James Bacchus 27 
Georges-Michel Abi-Saab 27 
Ujal Singh Bhatia 25 
A. V. Ganesan 24 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 23 
Yasuhei Taniguchi 22 
Julio Lacarte-Muró 22 
Peter Van den Bossche 22 
Florentino P. Feliciano 21 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann 21 
Luiz Olavo Baptista 21 
R. Ramírez-Hernández  20 
Thomas R. Graham 20 
Yuejiao Zhang 17 
Shree B. C. Servansing 16 
Mitsuo Matsushita 13 
David Unterhalter 13 
Said El-Naggar 12 
John S. Lockhart 11 
Merit E. Janow 10 
Jennifer Hillman 10 
Christopher Beeby 10 
Lilia R. Bautista 9 
Seung Wha Chang 9 
Hong Zhao 9 
Shotaro Oshima 9 
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